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Prioritization Debt: Why the Decision You Keep Postponing Gets More Expensive

Prioritization Debt Begins When a Decision Is Delayed

Prioritization debt rarely begins with an obviously bad decision. More often, it starts with a reasonable delay. A security initiative is too expensive to approve immediately, a remediation program depends on another project, a legacy system cannot be replaced without operational disruption, or leadership wants one more assessment before committing resources. Each of these is a fair reason to pause. The trouble starts when pausing becomes the habit and the hard choice never actually gets made. 

Research on decision inertia helps explain why this happens. May et al. distinguish between simple inaction and a more conflicted state in which action is recognized as necessary but remains inhibited by uncertainty, anticipated regret, fear of blame, or excessive risk aversion. They also distinguish decision inertia from decision avoidance, where the choice itself is actively deferred or ignored. In organizational settings, these two patterns can look almost identical from the outside: the same issue remains open, the same risk returns to the same meeting, and the same decision is moved forward without a clear conclusion.

More Information Becomes a Way to Wait 

Decision inertia can emerge from two seemingly responsible behaviors: searching for more information when there is little left to learn, and running through possible outcomes again and again until nothing gets done. This is particularly relevant in cybersecurity, where uncertainty is normal, and additional data is almost always available.

A security team can always request another vulnerability scan, another risk estimate, another architecture review, another threat model, or another financial calculation. Sometimes that evidence changes the decision. Sometimes it simply creates the appearance that the decision is still being worked on.

Here’s a simple test. If new information could change which option you pick, it’s worth getting. If everyone already understands the trade-off, and the real problem is that every option has a cost, more data only delays the moment someone has to choose.

Prioritization debt starts to build when a team keeps gathering evidence but never agrees on how much evidence would be enough.

Complicated Problems Are Easier to Put Off 

Security prioritization is rarely a comparison between two clean alternatives. A single decision may involve technical dependencies, regulatory obligations, business continuity concerns, budget constraints, engineering capacity, third-party commitments, customer impact, and competing strategic initiatives. The more interconnected the problem becomes, the more difficult it is to identify a clearly superior option.

Ohms’ 2026 workplace decision-making research provides a useful explanation for what happens under these conditions. The study examines how cognitive biases behave under organizational stressors and finds that task complexity increases cognitive load and exacerbates decision avoidance. Time pressure, meanwhile, increases reliance on faster, heuristic forms of thinking. The paper grounds this in bounded rationality: decision-makers operate with limited time, limited information, and limited cognitive processing capacity, and those constraints become increasingly important as complexity rises. 

The Hardest Decisions Can Become Get Harder While They Wait

This creates a particularly difficult dynamic for cybersecurity governance because complexity is often both the reason for delay and one of its consequences.

Go back to that legacy access-control platform. It cannot be replaced because dozens of business applications depend on it. The migration is postponed because the dependency map is already complicated. During the next year, more applications are connected, more exceptions are approved, additional users depend on the platform, and more teams build processes around it. When the migration returns to the roadmap, the original problem has not simply waited twelve months. It has become larger.

The same pattern can occur with cloud architecture, data retention, third-party integrations, vulnerability remediation, privileged access, unsupported software, or accumulated policy exceptions. What appears to be postponement is often an active change in the environment around the decision.

This is why prioritization debt behaves more like debt than like an ordinary backlog. The postponed decision can become more expensive to resolve because the organization continues building around it.

More Analysis Is Not Always the Answer

When complexity increases cognitive load, the instinctive response is often to add even more analysis. Yet more analysis is not always the cure for complexity. It can sometimes increase the number of variables competing for attention.

A useful governance question is therefore not simply whether the organization has enough information, but whether the missing information is decision-relevant. If another assessment will not materially change the choice, commissioning it may only extend the period in which the organization remains undecided.

The challenge is not to eliminate uncertainty before acting. In many cybersecurity decisions, that standard is impossible. The challenge is to identify the level of uncertainty the organization is willing to tolerate and then make the trade-off visible.

Time Changes the Priority You Think You Are Postponing

A postponed item often looks static inside a roadmap. Its title remains the same, the risk description remains familiar, and the deadline simply moves from one quarter to another. That can create the illusion that the organization is preserving the same choice for later.

Martinsuo’s 2026 study of time in project portfolio management shows why that assumption is weak. Portfolio management inherently involves projects competing for shared resources, and decisions therefore include determining which projects proceed now, which are postponed, and which are terminated. The paper also emphasizes path dependency: current decisions influence the options and commitments available in future periods. 

A priority delayed today may return in a very different environment. Engineering capacity may already be allocated. A regulatory deadline may be closer. The infrastructure may have changed. A new acquisition may have increased the scope. An incident may have altered risk tolerance. Another major initiative may now compete for the same budget.

The issue may have retained the same name, but it is no longer the same decision.

Every Delay Borrows From the Future

Martinsuo frames time as a scarce resource in much the same way as people and money. Projects compete for it, and overcommitment across too many simultaneous initiatives creates portfolio-level problems. Dependencies also mean that changes in one project can affect the timing of others. 

For prioritization debt, this means something important: every unresolved priority becomes a potential claim on future capacity.

Even when no resources are assigned to the item today, the organization may still expect to address it eventually. That future work will need people, budget, change windows, management attention, and operational tolerance. At the same time, new priorities will continue to arrive.

Eventually, a future quarter can become overcrowded with work inherited from earlier periods, not because leadership deliberately chose that portfolio, but because previous decisions were repeatedly moved forward.

The debt becomes visible only when too many postponed obligations mature at the same time.

Decisions You Put Off Keep Eating Up Time 

The cost of prioritization debt is not limited to delayed execution. Unresolved priorities also continue to demand attention.

Martinsuo’s review notes that managers have limited time and limited cognitive capacity, and that multiple projects compete for both attention and resources. It also highlights evidence that delayed and new projects can consume more meeting time than projects progressing normally, while switching between multiple simultaneous activities can create additional inefficiencies and overload. 

In cybersecurity, that pattern is easy to recognize. A risk is discussed in one quarter, postponed, and then reviewed again in the next. The assessment has to be refreshed because circumstances have changed. Engineering provides a new estimate. Procurement updates pricing. The risk owner is asked whether business conditions have shifted. The same issue returns to the steering committee with slightly different numbers and essentially the same unresolved choice.

None of those activities looks especially expensive on its own.

The cumulative cost can be substantial.

Old Problems Crowd Out New Risks 

Security organizations operate in an environment where new work continuously enters the system. Vulnerabilities are discovered, infrastructure changes, new regulations create obligations, third parties introduce dependencies, incidents expose weaknesses, audits identify control gaps, and business teams adopt new technology.

Martinsuo’s contextual view of time is useful here because it emphasizes that project portfolios operate within changing environments characterized by turbulence, complexity, dependencies, and evolving prioritization needs. A portfolio cannot therefore be treated as a static list that merely waits to be executed.

This is where prioritization debt begins to compound. Old unresolved decisions remain inside the portfolio while new priorities arrive around them. Leadership must now evaluate today’s risks alongside yesterday’s unfinished choices, and the decision space becomes increasingly crowded.

The organization is not simply carrying more work.

It’s carrying more decisions nobody has made.

Choosing to Wait Is Not the Same as Putting Off the Choice 

There is nothing inherently wrong with deciding that a security initiative should wait. In fact, mature governance requires organizations to make exactly those choices because resources are finite and not every risk can be addressed at the same time.

The distinction is whether postponement is the result of an explicit prioritization decision or a substitute for one.

Portfolio management is an ongoing process in which projects must be evaluated across different time horizons and continuously aligned with strategic objectives. Portfolio evolution therefore requires repeated decisions about selection, timing, allocation, and termination rather than a one-time ranking exercise. 

A genuine reprioritization contains a trade-off. One initiative receives resources instead of another. The consequences of the delay are understood. Someone owns the decision. There is a reason for revisiting it later.

Passive postponement looks different. The priority remains officially important, but nobody funds it. The risk remains unacceptable, but nobody accepts it. The work remains on the roadmap, but the date keeps moving.

That is how a critical initiative can remain critical for years without becoming executable.

When Escalating Turns Into Passing the Buck 

May et al. identify decision deferral as one component of decision inertia and describe it as passing responsibility to others or postponing commitment. The authors acknowledge that deferral can sometimes be appropriate, particularly where escalation is genuinely required, but excessive reliance on it can weaken accountability and autonomy. 

In security governance, escalation is often necessary. A CISO may not have authority to accept a business risk, terminate a major project, or allocate enterprise funding.

But escalation should move the decision toward someone who can make it.

So whenever something gets postponed, ask one simple question: what decision was actually made?

If the answer explains what received priority instead, what consequence is being accepted, who owns that trade-off, and what would trigger reconsideration, then the organization has probably reprioritized.

If the answer is simply that the issue will be reviewed again next quarter, the organization may have postponed the decision without resolving it.

Conclusion: Prioritization Debt Is the Cost of Choices You Haven’t Made 

The most dangerous characteristic of prioritization debt is that its creation rarely produces an immediate failure. There is no outage when the meeting ends, no automatic penalty when the deadline moves, and no obvious financial line item labelled “cost of indecision.” Postponement can therefore feel safe.

The research behind the concept suggests otherwise.

May et al. show how decision paralysis, regret, fear of blame, excessive information seeking, and deferral can prevent action even when action is recognized as necessary. Ohms shows that increasing task complexity can intensify decision avoidance rather than automatically producing better analysis. Martinsuo shows that time, capacity, dependencies, and evolving context change the portfolio in which those decisions will eventually be made. 

Together, these findings suggest that the real danger is not simply having unfinished work. Every security organization will always have unfinished work.

The warning sign is a portfolio full of priorities that remain too important to remove, too risky to accept, too expensive to fund, and too uncomfortable to decide.

Those items are not merely backlog.

They are decisions the organization has repeatedly carried forward, and every time they move into another quarter without an explicit trade-off, they bring part of the previous quarter with them.

For Further Reading

This blog post is based on insights and analysis from:

  • Martinsuo, Miia. “Time in project portfolio management: Objective, subjective, and contextual.” Project Leadership and Society (2026): 100221. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plas.2026.100221 
  • May, Brandon, et al. “: how ethics, decision modalities and narrative framing influence decision inertia in a 360 degree extended reality environment.” Cognition, Technology & Work 27.3 (2025): 611-633. 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-025-00815-8 

  • Ohms, Benjamin. “Methodology for investigating moderating relationships in cognitive biases within workplace decision-making.” Frontiers in Psychology 17 (2026): 1705404. 

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1705404 

CISO-Board Communication: Five Gaps Between Cyber Risk and Decisions

Why Clear Cyber Reporting Still Leaves Boards Without a Decision

A board can understand every word in a cybersecurity presentation and still leave the room unsure what it needs to decide.

That is the challenge at the heart of CISO-board communication. The usual advice is familiar: lose the jargon, speak the language of business, and simplify the dashboard. All useful. None of it guarantees that directors can see the decision behind the data.

A CISO may explain that critical vulnerabilities are increasing, privileged-access exceptions remain open, endpoint coverage has fallen, or a key platform is approaching end of support. The presentation can be clear, concise, and technically accurate, yet none of those facts automatically tells directors whether the organization should accept the exposure, accelerate remediation, allocate more funding, delay a business initiative, change a supplier, or tolerate operational disruption.

That is where the real translation gap begins.

Mengnjo and Shawe describe cybersecurity translation as a structured governance process rather than a reporting exercise. Their Executive Cybersecurity Translation Model moves from technical data through contextualization, risk aggregation and prioritization, executive communication, decision-making, and finally board oversight. The important point is that technical information is not simply simplified on its way upward; it is progressively transformed into something leadership can interpret and act upon.

A much broader 2026 review by Varghese and Bui reaches a similar conclusion after analyzing 623 studies on information security risk management. They identify the translation of technical cyber risk into board-level information as a distinct research problem and frame it as an organizational information-processing challenge: boards work under uncertainty and limited attention, while cybersecurity functions produce increasingly complex information.

The challenge, then, is not merely to make cybersecurity easier to understand. It is to make the decision hidden inside the cybersecurity problem visible.

What Boards Need from Cyber Risk Reporting

Security teams live close to the machinery of risk. They need alerts, vulnerabilities, attack paths, control failures, configuration drift, identity weaknesses, third-party exposures, incident patterns, and remediation queues because those details determine what happens operationally.

The board sees the same environment through a different set of responsibilities.

That does not mean directors need less accurate information. It means they need information organized around a different responsibility. Technical cybersecurity reporting often emphasizes intrusion attempts, vulnerability scores, patch statistics, malware detections, and network anomalies. These indicators may be highly meaningful to security professionals while still failing to explain the organizational implications required for executive decision-making.

A board does not need to know merely that a vulnerability is critical, but whether that vulnerability affects a system supporting an important business process, how likely exploitation is under current conditions, what disruption could follow, which controls reduce the exposure, and whether the remaining risk requires a management or board-level decision.

That difference is small on a slide and enormous in governance.

Why Fewer Vulnerabilities Do Not Necessarily Mean Less Risk 

Consider a dashboard showing that critical vulnerabilities have fallen from 180 to 120.

The trend looks positive, and the number is easy to understand. Yet the board still does not know whether risk improved.

Perhaps most of the vulnerabilities removed were attached to low-value systems while several unresolved weaknesses remain on a platform supporting revenue, production, customer data, or critical operations. Perhaps remediation requires downtime that the business has postponed twice. Perhaps compensating controls exist, but only for another three months. Perhaps the remaining risk already sits outside approved tolerance.

The number itself cannot answer those questions.

This is why the translation process places contextualization before executive communication. Technical data must first be connected to assets, business processes, likelihood, impact, and key risk drivers before it can become a meaningful portfolio of priorities for leadership.

The goal is to preserve the technical facts while making clear why they matter now.

Why CISO-Board Communication Takes More Than Simpler Language 

The advice to “speak the language of business” assumes that the CISO already has the right information and just needs easier words. 

Varghese and Bui suggest something more structural. Their review identifies technical-to-board translation as an organizational information-processing challenge because directors operate with limited attention and must make decisions under significant uncertainty. Cyber reporting therefore has to match the board’s decision requirements rather than simply compress everything the security function knows.

The boardroom is already crowded: cyber risk competes for attention with financial performance, regulation, growth, operational resilience, talent, acquisitions, customer issues, litigation, market conditions, and capital allocation. The board cannot absorb every security signal simply because each one carries some degree of risk.

That leaves the CISO with a difficult compression problem. Too little information can hide uncertainty and create false confidence, while too much can bury the decision beneath operational detail.

The useful middle ground is not “simple cybersecurity.” It is enough information for directors to understand the exposure, challenge the assumptions, compare the options, and decide what the organization is prepared to do.

Five Gaps That Weaken CISO Board Reporting 

Most failed board communication is not spectacular. It fails gradually as information moves through the organization, until a complicated operational reality arrives in the boardroom as a heat map, maturity score, or status update.

The following five gaps are where decision value is often lost.

1. Technical Findings Without Business Exposure

The first gap appears when security reports what is wrong without showing what the organization could lose.

An unsupported server, incomplete segmentation, excessive privileges, a vulnerable supplier connection, or weak authentication describes a technical condition. Board relevance appears only when that condition is connected to the business process depending on it.

Cybersecurity information should be contextualized across operational, financial, regulatory, legal, and organizational consequences. In a healthcare setting, a technical security weakness may simultaneously affect clinical operations, patient safety, privacy obligations, financial stability, and institutional reputation.

The same logic applies elsewhere. A weak control becomes governable when leadership can see the business exposure sitting behind it.

2. Business Exposure Without Clear Priorities 

The second gap appears when everything important reaches the board with the same urgency.

Most organizations have more cyber problems than they can resolve simultaneously, which means prioritization is unavoidable. The board should not become a larger version of the security team’s triage meeting.

Risk aggregation and prioritization should sit between technical contextualization and executive communication. Risks need to be assessed across systems and business units, then prioritized according to organizational significance rather than presented as a flat list of security issues.

This is also where trade-offs become visible. A remediation program may reduce cyber risk but require production downtime. Replacing a supplier may reduce concentration risk but disrupt delivery. Additional resilience may require investment that competes with another strategic program.

Those conflicts are not failures of security analysis. They are precisely the questions governance exists to resolve.

3. Cyber Risk Without Response Options 

A CISO can explain a risk perfectly and still leave the board with nothing to decide.

“We need to reduce this risk” is not an actionable recommendation when every available response carries a different cost, timing, and consequence.

A useful board discussion should show the choices: accelerate remediation, introduce compensating controls, tolerate the exposure until a planned transformation, restrict a business activity, replace a dependency, transfer part of the financial risk, or formally accept the residual exposure.

Each option changes something beyond cybersecurity.

Varghese and Bui’s review reinforces this connection between risk management and choice. Their integrated model treats information security risk management across processes, governance, and strategy, including explicit research streams on security investment and risk-informed decision-making.

The board does not need another description of the problem once the problem is understood. It needs to see the available paths through it.

4. Options Without a Clear Decision Owner 

Even strong reporting can stall when nobody knows who actually owns the final choice.

Security presents the exposure, the CIO explains technical constraints, finance discusses funding, the business challenges the operational cost, and the board asks whether management is comfortable with the risk. Everyone participates, but accountability quietly remains suspended between functions.

Translation therefore has to include governance.

Mengnjo and Shawe’s model does not end with executive communication. It continues through executive decision-making and board oversight, including risk monitoring, policy review, accountability, and compliance.

Identifying a risk does not automatically make the CISO accountable for accepting it. If a business decision creates the exposure, the accountable business owner should remain visible. If the response requires enterprise-level investment, executive management may have to resolve the trade-off. If residual exposure exceeds established appetite, escalation to the board may be appropriate.

Good reporting makes that decision path explicit.

5. Decisions Without Follow-Up 

The final gap appears after the meeting ends.

A remediation program is approved, a temporary exposure is accepted, or management commits to a deadline. Three months later, the next board pack arrives with a refreshed dashboard, while the previous decision has almost disappeared from view.

If leadership accepts a risk, subsequent reporting should show whether the assumptions behind that acceptance still hold. If money was approved, the board should see whether exposure changed as expected. If management committed to remediation, delay should remain visible rather than being absorbed into a new set of metrics.

Otherwise board oversight becomes a sequence of presentations rather than a record of decisions.

How to Turn Cyber Risk Reporting into Decisions

One of the simplest ways to improve CISO board communication is to reverse the usual reporting process.

Instead of starting with, “What cybersecurity metrics should we show?” begin with, “What decisions might leadership reasonably need to make?”

A typical security-first statement might say that 42 critical vulnerabilities remain open across internet-facing systems and that 12 have exceeded the remediation SLA.

A decision-first version would say that a revenue-critical platform remains exposed because remediation requires an outage the business has postponed twice, and management now has three options: accept the exposure until the scheduled migration, approve an accelerated maintenance window, or introduce a temporary compensating control with clearly defined limitations.

The technical facts have not disappeared. They have simply been placed behind the decision they support.

That progression closely reflects the Executive Cybersecurity Translation Model, where technical inputs become contextualized risk information, a prioritized risk portfolio, executive-ready insight, and ultimately strategic direction.

The strongest board reporting therefore starts at the end: what does leadership need to decide, challenge, approve, or consciously tolerate?

Translation Takes a Team: Why the CISO-Board Relationship Is a Shared Responsibility

There is a danger in treating every CISO-board communication problem as a failure of the CISO’s presentation skills.

Sometimes the reporting genuinely is too technical, too detailed, or too disconnected from business priorities. But translation also depends on the people receiving the information.

Executive and board cyber literacy is a foundational enabler of effective translation, alongside communication capability, governance frameworks, appropriate metrics, data quality, and continuous improvement.

A director does not need to understand exploit development or configure security controls, but a board overseeing a digitally dependent company should understand risk appetite, residual risk, resilience, material exposure, third-party dependency, control effectiveness, and incident preparedness well enough to challenge management intelligently.

Information security governance has evolved from a largely technical concern toward board-level oversight, while a persistent gap remains between governance decisions and the operational controls and day-to-day behavior beneath them.

Translation therefore has to move in both directions. The CISO must structure information around business consequences and choices, while the board must develop enough literacy to engage with those choices rather than treating cyber risk as a specialized technical domain that can simply be delegated downward.

Conclusion: Make the Decision Behind the Cyber Risk Clear

Cybersecurity reporting becomes valuable when it preserves the chain between what security sees and what leadership must choose.

That chain usually begins with a technical condition, moves through business exposure and consequence, then reaches prioritization, available responses, residual risk, ownership, and decision.

Not every cyber issue belongs at board level, and mature governance should prevent operational problems from being unnecessarily escalated. But when an issue does reach the board, directors should not have to reconstruct the decision from vulnerability counts, maturity scores, or control-status dashboards.

The translation should already have happened.

Recent research points in the same direction from two different angles. Mengnjo and Shawe describe cybersecurity translation as a governance capability connecting operational security with executive action, while Varghese and Bui identify technical-to-board translation as an unresolved problem at the intersection of technical risk and strategic governance.

That leaves the CISO with a more demanding task than simply making cybersecurity sound less technical.

The real work is making the decision inside the technical risk impossible to miss.

For Further Reading

This blog post is based on insights and analysis from:

  • Mengnjo, Gilbert & Shawe, Robb. (2026). “Translating Cybersecurity for Executive Decision-making: Bridging Technical Risk and Board-level Governance in Healthcare Organizations.” International Journal of Advanced Engineering and Management Research. 11. 128-144.  

https://doi.org/10.51505/ijaemr.2026.11309 

  • Varghese, Biju B., and Quang Bui. (2026). “An integrated framework for information security risk management: A mixed-methods systematic literature review.” Computers & Security: 104957.
    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.104957 

The CISO-CIO Relationship: The Collision Between Security, Speed, and Business

The CISO-CIO Relationship Is Difficult for a Good Reason

The CISO-CIO relationship is often described as a problem of personalities, communication styles, or competing executive agendas, but that explanation is too simple. A CIO who wants technology to remain available, efficient, scalable, and capable of supporting the business is doing the job the organization expects. A CISO who questions whether the same environment is resilient, defensible, compliant, and sufficiently protected is doing exactly the same.

The difficulty begins because both executives increasingly govern different consequences of the same decisions.

A cloud migration may improve scalability and simplify infrastructure, while simultaneously changing data flows, third-party dependencies, access models, and recovery assumptions. Connecting manufacturing systems to analytics platforms may increase operational visibility, but it can also pull previously isolated systems into the cybersecurity perimeter. Generative AI may improve productivity while creating new questions around data exposure, identity, intellectual property, and misuse.

The technology decision and the security decision are no longer easy to separate.

That change is reflected in recent research on the CISO role itself. Christopher Ramezan’s 2025 analysis of 250 CISO job postings across 27 countries found that organizations increasingly define the CISO as a strategic and management-focused executive rather than a deeply tactical technical specialist. Risk management, policy, strategic planning, incident management, communication, governance, and business alignment appear far more prominently than programming or expertise with specific software.

The CISO is no longer merely protecting systems after the technology organization has designed them. The role is moving directly into decisions about how technology should be governed, what risk is acceptable, where investment should go, and how business strategy should account for cyber exposure.

The boundary between CIO and CISO is therefore becoming harder to draw at exactly the moment when organizations need that boundary to be better governed.

Five Points of Tension in the CISO-CIO Relationship 

Technology Speed vs. Security Risk

The easiest version of the CISO-CIO conflict is the familiar one: the CIO wants speed, while the CISO wants control. In practice, however, most of the difficult decisions are not that clean.

The CIO may be accountable for availability, modernization, digital transformation, service delivery, and technology costs. The CISO may be accountable for cybersecurity strategy, resilience, risk management, security policy, and incident readiness. Operations wants systems to keep running, finance wants investment discipline, and the business wants new capabilities without unnecessary delay.

Eventually, all of those priorities meet in the same architecture.

The 2025 interview with Nestlé Group CIO Chris Wright and CISO John Petersen illustrates this particularly well. Their environment has changed from relatively centralized IT systems to a much more complex landscape involving cloud services, SaaS, connected factories, operational technology, AI, global data movement, and geopolitical risk. Wright notes that a growing portion of the CISO’s work no longer concerns conventional IT applications at all, yet many security decisions still require the CIO’s teams to act quickly.

The CISO may identify the exposure, but the CIO often controls much of the environment required to change it. The CIO may own the technology program, while the business ultimately owns the consequences of delaying it or accepting the remaining risk.

Once the disagreement is framed as “security versus the business,” the conversation is already too shallow. The real question is how much security, resilience, speed, cost, and operational flexibility the organization is willing to buy, and what risk it is prepared to keep.

That is not a decision either executive should have to make alone.

Should the CISO Report to the CIO? 

Few questions generate as much debate as whether the CISO should report to the CIO.

The argument for separation is obvious. If the CISO reports to the executive responsible for technology delivery, the person expected to challenge technology risk may also be subordinate to the person whose priorities they occasionally need to slow, question, or escalate.

The opposite argument is equally practical. Cybersecurity recommendations eventually have to change networks, platforms, applications, endpoints, identities, cloud environments, and operational processes. A CISO who is organizationally independent but too far removed from technology execution may have authority on paper and very little influence in practice.

Nestlé keeps the CISO within the CIO organization. Both executives say this helps security and IT act faster when infrastructure teams need to change priorities. Petersen also argues that, unlike CISOs who mainly advise on policy from outside IT, having operational responsibility gives him more direct influence over security outcomes. 

That does not mean every CISO should report to the CIO. The authors themselves note that there is still limited research capable of identifying one reporting model as universally superior.

The more useful question is whether the organization preserves both influence and challenge.

The CISO needs enough proximity to technology decisions to shape them before they become expensive to reverse, but also needs a credible escalation route when security concerns cannot be resolved inside the technology organization. The CIO needs the authority to run technology without every disagreement becoming a governance crisis, but should not quietly absorb enterprise cyber risk simply because the affected systems sit inside IT.

The reporting line matters. The decision rights around it matter more.

Security Budgets: Who Pays, Who Prioritizes, Who Accepts Risk? 

Budget conversations expose the CISO-CIO relationship particularly quickly because security spending competes with every other technology priority.

The security function can almost always identify another control, monitoring capability, specialist, redundancy layer, or remediation program that would reduce risk. The CIO can almost always identify another modernization project, reliability improvement, automation initiative, or capacity investment with obvious operational value. Somewhere outside both functions, the business is asking why either one needs more money.

Wright describes cybersecurity investment alongside other technology and resilience investments such as failover systems, reliability, and upgrades. Petersen similarly emphasizes that security spending needs to be tied to the risk being reduced rather than defended as a principle in itself.

In many cases, budget disagreements are actually disagreements about risk. The CISO should be able to explain what exposure an investment reduces, what remains afterwards, and what happens if the decision is delayed. The CIO should be able to explain which competing technology or operational objective will be displaced. If the trade-off is significant enough, the final decision may need to move above both executives.

Cybersecurity then becomes part of normal enterprise risk allocation rather than a protected category of spending that must be justified through fear.

How CISO-CIO Trust Shapes Incident Response 

Governance is relatively easy when there is time to prepare the presentation, gather evidence, schedule a committee, and debate the options. Cyber incidents rarely provide that luxury.

The CIO-CISO relationship becomes especially important when decisions must be made quickly and without a large steering group. Incidents, third-party issues, false breach claims, and reputational threats may require technical analysis and external communication to move almost at the same time. Wright describes situations in which a public claim can spread quickly enough that the organization has very little time to prepare a response, even when no genuine breach has occurred.

In those moments, trust stops being a soft leadership concept and becomes part of incident-response capability.

A CISO who has to spend the first hour convincing the CIO that a warning deserves attention has already lost time. A CIO who has learned that every security concern arrives labelled as urgent may hesitate when urgency is finally justified. A relationship in which difficult information is carefully packaged to manage perception will move more slowly than one in which uncertainty can be discussed openly.

Trust is especially important in these situations. Both executives need to be able to raise difficult concerns and discuss uncertainty without turning the conversation into a defence of their own function. 

For that reason, CIO-CISO collaboration should be tested in the same way organizations test technical recovery and crisis communication. Tabletop exercises should force disagreements about shutting systems down, restoring potentially compromised services, delaying remediation, accepting degraded operations, prioritizing business units, and acting on incomplete information.

The point is not to make the CIO and CISO agree beforehand.

The point is to understand how they make decisions when they do not.

Cyber Risk Ownership: Responsibility Without Authority 

The modern CISO is frequently held responsible for protecting an environment they do not fully control.

Ramezan’s study shows how broad the role has become, covering areas such as risk management, incident response, privacy, strategy, and business continuity. Yet many of the systems creating those risks belong elsewhere. Infrastructure may sit with the CIO, operational systems with business units, and vendor decisions with procurement. 

This creates a dangerous gap between responsibility and authority.

The CISO may be accountable for cybersecurity without having the authority to determine every technology architecture. The CIO may own the systems without having the authority to accept every business consequence of the risks they create. Business leaders may own the outcome without understanding the technical exposure underneath it.

When those distinctions remain implicit, the same risk can be identified by security, technically owned by IT, delayed by operations, financially deprioritized by leadership, and still appear after an incident as a failure of the security team.

That is not a communication problem. It is a governance problem.

Shared Cybersecurity Responsibility Needs Clear Decision Rights 

It is tempting to solve this by saying that cybersecurity is everyone’s responsibility, but broad shared responsibility can become just another way of avoiding precise accountability.

The organization still needs to know who sets mandatory security requirements, who owns implementation, who can approve an exception, who accepts residual business risk, and when disagreement must be escalated.

Those answers do not need to live entirely with either the CIO or the CISO.

They do need to exist before the decision becomes urgent.

The same principle applies earlier in the technology lifecycle. When security first enters a major project after the architecture has been selected, contracts signed, and launch date announced, almost every control becomes more expensive. The CISO is then forced either to accept exposure or become the executive delaying the initiative, while the CIO is forced to defend decisions that may have been reasonable before security entered the conversation.

Early involvement changes the economics of the disagreement.

Security can shape architecture while alternatives still exist, and technology teams can challenge security assumptions before they harden into requirements.

That is where productive CIO-CISO collaboration actually begins.

Conclusion: Stop Trying to Remove the Tension

There will always be moments when the CISO wants more control, the CIO wants more speed, or operations cannot support the remediation window security would prefer. 

That does not mean the relationship has failed. 

The failure begins when the trade-off remains hidden, when nobody knows who has authority to make the decision, when security is left accountable for a choice it could not control, or when technology quietly absorbs a level of business risk it was never authorized to accept.

The goal is not perfect agreement between the CIO and CISO. It is productive friction supported by clear governance and decision rights. 

As their responsibilities continue to overlap, organizations will need to get better at managing the space between security, technology, operations, and business priorities.

The key question is simple: when the next technology decision creates both business value and cyber risk, does everyone already know who gets to decide what happens next?

For Further Reading

This blog post is based on insights and analysis from:

  • Johnson, M. Eric, and Hans Brechbühl. “The CIO–CISO relationship in a globally networked business – An interview with Nestlé AG.” Electronic Markets 35.1 (2025): 44. 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12525-025-00786-8 

  • Ramezan, Christopher A. “Understanding the chief information security officer: Qualifications and responsibilities for cybersecurity leadership.” Computers & Security 152 (2025): 104363. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2025.104363

Decision-Making Under Uncertainty: How Security Leaders Decide Without the Full Picture

Fog Is Part of the Forecast 

Decision-making under uncertainty is not an unusual condition in cybersecurity; it is the environment in which most consequential security decisions are made. A CISO deciding whether to accelerate an investment cannot know exactly which threat will materialize next, a board reviewing ransomware exposure cannot know how well every control will perform under real pressure, and an executive evaluating a critical supplier rarely has complete visibility into everything that could go wrong.

The difficulty is not simply that information is missing. Some of the information that leaders want cannot be measured with the precision they would prefer, while other assumptions may become outdated before the decision has had time to prove itself. Recent research suggests that the more useful goal is therefore not to eliminate uncertainty, but to understand where it sits inside the decision and make sure it is not hidden behind dashboards, risk scores, or numbers that appear more certain than the evidence behind them.

Rule 1: Stop Waiting for the Full Picture 

A 2026 study examined cybersecurity decision-making across strategic, tactical, and operational roles, drawing on interviews with 36 professionals across six organizations, including senior executives, board members, governance specialists, and operational security teams. The researchers describe cybersecurity decisions as being shaped by uncertainty, time pressure, information asymmetry, technical constraints, organizational priorities, and human judgment, all at the same time.

What makes this especially important is that the study identified 23 different factors influencing effective decision-making, ranging from resources, regulation, and organizational structure to risk profile, experience, confidence, teamwork, bias, and cybersecurity posture. More than half of those factors operated across several organizational levels rather than belonging neatly to one team or one decision-maker.

This means a security decision is rarely just a technical response to a technical problem. The same threat can lead to very different choices depending on the organization’s appetite for risk, the maturity of its security program, the experience of the people involved, the resources available, and the consequences the business is prepared to accept. The real question is therefore not simply whether the organization has enough data, but whether leaders understand what is shaping the judgment they are about to make.

More Information Does Not Remove Judgment

It is tempting to imagine that better telemetry, more dashboards, or a more sophisticated risk model will eventually turn cybersecurity into a clean optimization problem, where the organization identifies the threat, calculates the likelihood, measures the impact, and selects the best control. In practice, every one of those steps still depends on interpretation, and interpretation is where uncertainty enters.

The same 2026 study found that professionals rely not only on formal information, but also on experience, awareness, confidence, team dynamics, and their understanding of the wider threat landscape. In other words, data matters enormously, but it does not arrive pre-labeled with the correct decision attached to it.

Rule 2: Do Not Mistake Precision for Certainty 

A 2025 study examined cyber risk management in five multi-billion-dollar organizations through 27 in-depth interviews with cybersecurity professionals, executives, board members, risk managers, and internal auditors. The researchers expected to find mature quantitative risk management in at least some of the organizations they studied, but instead found that many supposedly quantitative approaches still depended heavily on qualitative judgment. 

The authors describe this as a “quantitative veneer”, where numbers create the appearance of rigorous measurement even though the assumptions underneath them remain subjective. Organizations may present risk scores, probability scales, technical metrics, or financial estimates, but the route from raw information to the final number is often far less precise than the result suggests. 

That tension becomes especially visible when organizations attempt to estimate likelihood and consequence. Historical cybersecurity data is limited, attack techniques change quickly, and even when comparable incidents exist, their relevance may fade as architectures, controls, and business dependencies evolve. The study also shows that the consequences of a cyber incident can include downtime, customer loss, reputational damage, legal exposure, regulatory costs, contractual penalties, and other effects that interact rather than add up neatly. 

A Precise Number Can Still Be an Estimate

The danger is not the number itself. Quantification can help leadership compare risks, prioritize investments, and communicate more clearly, but it becomes misleading when precision in presentation is mistaken for certainty in knowledge.

A loss estimate of several million dollars may be useful, yet it still depends on assumptions about the duration of disruption, the effectiveness of current controls, the systems affected, customer behavior, recovery time, and regulatory consequences. A risk score can organize discussion, but it should not end it.

For security leaders, the better question is not simply, “What is the number?” but, “How was this number built, what assumptions support it, and how much would the conclusion change if one of those assumptions moved?”

Rule 3: Data Needs a Human in the Room  

The same study introduces a useful concept for understanding what organizations are actually doing: qualculation – a combination of quantitative analysis and qualitative judgment. Rather than treating numbers and professional judgment as competing approaches, the researchers argue that cyber risk management often requires both because perfect quantification is rarely available.

This is especially important at executive level, where the decision is rarely about a single technical metric. A CISO may have vulnerability counts, patching rates, control maturity scores, threat intelligence, historical incident data, and financial information, yet leadership still has to decide what those signals mean for the organization’s current priorities.

Professional judgment fills the space between evidence and action, but that judgment should not remain invisible. If a recommendation depends on experience, assumptions, or expert interpretation, leadership should be able to see that clearly rather than receive a conclusion that appears mechanically produced.

Make the Reasoning Behind the Number Visible

If a CISO presents a ransomware exposure estimate, the board should understand more than the headline figure. It should know what probability was assumed, which controls were considered effective, what recovery time was used, which business processes were treated as critical, and whether indirect effects such as reputational or regulatory damage were included.

That does not make the decision less rigorous. In many cases, it makes the rigor more visible, because it reveals where the analysis ends and judgment begins.

The strongest decisions are not those in which judgment disappears. They are those in which judgment is explicit enough to be challenged.

Rule 4: Kick the Assumptions and See What Breaks  

Another research from 2025 focuses directly on uncertainty in cybersecurity decision-support models. Their starting point is that cybersecurity metrics, particularly estimates of security-control effectiveness, are inherently imprecise. 

Even a seemingly simple question such as whether a control is effective can be difficult to answer with confidence. A firewall that has never been breached may be highly effective, but it may also have avoided a sophisticated enough attack, while the absence of incidents does not automatically prove that the control will perform equally well against a different threat in the future. 

Instead of assuming one precise value for control effectiveness, the researchers model several possible scenarios and ask how different security decisions perform across them. One of the approaches they examine is minmax regret, which looks for a choice that minimizes how badly the organization could regret that decision if reality turns out differently from what was expected. They also develop a min-product approach designed to reduce risk more consistently across a range of scenarios.

The mathematics is not the most important lesson for executives. The more useful principle is that a security decision should not only be tested under the assumptions that make it look correct.

Ask What Happens When the Assumption Moves

A security investment may appear attractive when the expected control effectiveness is high, the estimated recovery time is short, and the supplier dependency is believed to be manageable. The decision becomes much more revealing when leaders ask what happens if one of those assumptions changes.

Would the investment still make sense if the control delivered only half the expected protection? Would the organization make the same prioritization if recovery took twice as long? Would a supplier still be considered acceptable if the business later discovered that several critical processes depended on it?

The point is not to invent endless worst-case scenarios until no decision feels safe. It is to understand whether the decision remains defensible across several plausible versions of reality rather than only under the one forecast that was used to justify it.

Rule 5: Give Executives Context, Not More Noise

The 2025 cyber risk management study also found a recurring gap between technical teams and senior leadership. Security and IT professionals often hold much deeper technical knowledge, while executives and boards depend on those teams to translate the meaning of that information into something that can support business decisions.

The problem is that more reporting does not automatically close that gap. The organizations in the study often provided leaders with information from different functions, using different metrics, methodologies, and levels of detail, which could make cyber risk reporting more complicated rather than more useful. Executives and boards were often more interested in forward-looking questions: what is changing in the threat landscape, what is happening to peers, and how prepared the organization would be if a similar event occurred.

The board does not need every vulnerability, every control metric, or every technical exception; it needs enough context to understand what those signals mean for the business, where the uncertainty lies, and what decision is actually being requested.

How CISOteria Makes the Mess Make Sense 

CISOteria does not try to eliminate uncertainty from cybersecurity decisions, because that would create exactly the kind of false confidence this post warns against. Instead, it helps make the information behind those decisions more connected, current, and easier to interpret. 

Instead of forcing CISOs to piece together risk, vulnerabilities, compliance, third-party exposure, remediation progress, incidents, and workplans from separate systems and spreadsheets, CISOteria brings them into one operational view. That makes it easier to see how technical findings connect to business impact, who owns the next action, what has changed, and where residual exposure remains. 

The platform also helps bridge the gap between technical evidence and executive decision-making. Current risk, compliance, third-party, and incident data can be translated into board-ready reporting, while risks and vulnerabilities can be connected to business context, priorities, treatment plans, ownership, and remediation progress. 

That does not make the underlying uncertainty disappear. It gives leaders a stronger basis for working with it: a more current picture of the cyber program, clearer connections between evidence and business impact, and less dependence on fragmented reporting that may already be outdated by the time a decision reaches the boardroom. 

Conclusion: The Goal Is Not Certainty 

Decision-making under uncertainty is not a sign that the organization lacks maturity; in cybersecurity, it is often the reality of making consequential choices before the evidence is complete. What matters is whether leaders can separate what is known from what is estimated, recognize where judgment is filling the gaps, and understand how much the decision depends on assumptions that may later prove wrong.

The three studies point in the same direction from different angles. Cybersecurity decisions are shaped by organizational context and human judgment, quantitative risk analysis can create an illusion of certainty when assumptions remain subjective, and stronger decisions are those that remain reasonable across several plausible scenarios rather than only one expected future.

The goal is not to predict the future perfectly, because cybersecurity rarely offers that luxury. It is to make a decision that can be explained, challenged, and revisited when the evidence changes, while remaining clear about why that decision was defensible with the information available at the time.

For Further Reading

This blog post is based on insights and analysis from:

  • Dawson, Niamh, et al. “Informed cybersecurity decisions: A synthesis of expert perspectives.” Computers & Security (2026): 104927. 

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.104927 

  • Zhang, Yunxiao, and Pasquale Malacaria. “Dealing with uncertainty in cybersecurity decision support.” Computers & Security 148 (2025): 104153. 

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2024.104153 

  • Slapničar, Sergeja, Micheal Axelsen, and Marc Eulerich. “Cyber risk management: an illusion of a risk-based approach.” Journal of Management Control (2025): 1-36. 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00187-025-00401-z 

Cyber Crisis Communication: What to Say While an Incident Is Still Unfolding

Cyber Crisis Communication Starts Before You Have All the Answers

In one of our previous discussions on post-incident recovery, we looked at the role communication plays after the immediate crisis begins to ease. Even when systems are restored, customers, employees, partners, regulators, and the board may still need explanations, evidence of corrective action, and reasons to believe the organization has regained control.

But communication does not begin when the incident ends.

Cyber crisis communication begins before the investigation is complete. While security teams are still containing the incident and establishing the facts, executives, employees, customers, and regulators may already need answers. 

At that stage, the forensic investigation may still be incomplete. The scope may change. Some information may be too sensitive to share. Different stakeholders may need different answers, and every statement the organization makes can affect what happens next. 

The organization is therefore expected to communicate at exactly the moment when certainty is lowest. 

This is where crisis communication differs from post-incident trust repair. The immediate challenge is to keep people informed while containment, investigation, recovery, and sometimes negotiations with the attacker are still underway.

Recent research identifies this as one of the characteristics that makes cyber crisis communication different from more traditional crisis communication. In many crises, communication follows the disruptive event. In a cyber incident, communication frequently happens while forensic investigation and operational response are still in progress.

A public statement can affect a ransomware negotiation. Information shared internally may reach an attacker. In a third-party breach, an organization may depend on another company’s investigation before it can answer its own customers. 

For CISOs, the challenge begins before the full picture is available: how do you communicate while the incident is still unfolding?

Communication Is Part of Cyber Incident Response

Cyber incident response is often described through technical activities such as detection, analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery.

Communication runs through the same process.

A 2025 study on cybersecurity crisis communication argues that organizations need structured communication protocols throughout the incident lifecycle rather than ad hoc messaging. Its proposed model integrates communication into notification and escalation, analysis and response, external stakeholder communication, and post-incident review. 

Poor communication can make an already difficult incident harder to manage. Different teams may work from different versions of the situation. Executives may receive information that has already changed. Customer service may answer questions before an agreed position exists. Employees may learn developments through the media. Legal, security, communications, and management may each apply a different standard when deciding what can safely be shared. 

The result is fragmentation at exactly the moment when the organization needs a common understanding of what is happening.

The same 2025 research emphasizes predefined roles, escalation paths, communication responsibilities, and structured information sharing across technical, legal, management, and public relations teams. 

Knowing who communicates is therefore only the first step. The harder decision is determining what can responsibly be said while the facts are still changing.

The Goal Is Clarity Under Uncertainty

In the early hours of a serious cyber incident, the organization may still have only a partial picture. Even so, waiting to communicate may not be practical. 

The organization should clearly separate confirmed facts from information that is still uncertain. A useful update can explain what has been confirmed so far, what the investigation is still examining, what actions are already underway, which groups appear to be affected based on current evidence, and when more information is expected. 

The 2026 study supports this approach by highlighting the value of communicating what is known, what remains under review, and what is still unclear. 

This allows the organization to provide useful information without presenting an incomplete forensic picture as a final conclusion.

Build a Cyber Crisis Communication Plan Before You Need It

The worst time to decide how cyber crisis communication works is when the incident is already unfolding.

By then, information is changing quickly. Technical teams are focused on containment. Legal teams may be assessing reporting obligations. Executives want answers. Employees and customers may already be asking questions.

A communication plan therefore needs to define the process rather than predict the exact wording of a future statement.

The 2025 research emphasizes predefined roles, escalation paths, communication channels, stakeholder engagement, and coordination between security, management, legal, and communications functions. The 2026 research goes further, arguing that communication should remain closely connected to forensic and operational work because communication decisions can directly affect negotiations, investigations, and containment. 

For CISOs, preparation means establishing how technical information reaches decision-makers, how uncertainty is communicated, how earlier statements are updated, how alternative channels are activated when normal systems fail, and how critical suppliers are expected to share information during an incident. 

The aim is to reduce improvisation when pressure is highest and keep communication connected to the live response. 

CISOteria can support this process by keeping risks, responsibilities, decisions, and follow-up actions connected in one operational view. This gives security leaders a clearer picture of what is known, who owns the next step, and which stakeholders need to be involved as the incident develops.

One Incident Does Not Mean One Message

A cyber incident rarely has a single audience. 

The 2025 research identifies audience adaptation as an important part of structured cyber crisis communication. Technical teams, executives, regulators, customers, and the media have different information needs, requiring messages to be adapted to each audience to reduce the risk of misunderstanding. 

Employees Need Direction

Internal communication becomes especially important when the incident begins affecting daily operations.

Employees may lose access to systems, remote work tools, shared files, or normal communication channels. They may also receive questions from customers, partners, or other external contacts before the organization has published a broader update.

The 2026 study describes employees as both affected participants and important parts of the wider information environment. What they understand, what they repeat, and how they respond to questions can influence the course of the incident.

Internal communication should therefore focus on practical direction. Employees need to understand which systems are safe to use, which alternative channels have been approved, where questions should be directed, and what information should remain restricted.

Executives Need Decision-Relevant Information

Executives have a different information need.

They usually do not need every forensic artifact or technical hypothesis. They need enough reliable information to understand the business consequences and make decisions while the investigation continues.

The CISO therefore has to translate a changing technical picture into decision-relevant information. That may include the operational impact, possible exposure of customer data, regulatory implications, dependencies on third parties, the status of recovery, and any communication decision that could affect the investigation or negotiations.

The Attacker May Be Listening Too

Cyber incident communication must account for the possibility that threat actors are monitoring what the organization says publicly – and potentially internally.

The 2026 research repeatedly notes that threat actors may monitor public communication and, depending on their level of access, may also be able to observe internal communication.

External communication can unintentionally reveal useful details to the attacker. A statement may expose information about disruption, recovery progress, priorities, or the organization’s negotiating position. 

Organizations should therefore consider the operational impact of a message before publishing it. 

Cyber Crisis Communication Depends on the Type of Incident

Cyber crisis communication does not follow one fixed template. The right approach depends on the type of incident and the operational risks created by disclosure. The 2026 research highlights several important differences: 

  • Ransomware: Communication may affect negotiations, reveal the scale of disruption, or expose recovery capabilities. Organizations need to keep stakeholders informed while preserving enough flexibility to adapt as the incident develops.
  • Third-party compromise: The organization may need to communicate with its own customers while depending on the compromised supplier for forensic information. Clear pre-incident agreements on information sharing, update timing, and external communication can reduce delays and confusion.
  • Nation-state espionage: Broad communication may compromise an ongoing investigation or alert an attacker who is still active. Early communication may therefore need to remain limited to a small need-to-know group, sometimes through alternative channels.

The key point is that timing, transparency, and the level of detail should reflect the operational context of the incident. In some cases, faster communication is necessary. In others, restraint protects the response. 

Message Framing Comes After Evidence

Once the organization has established what it can responsibly confirm, it still has to decide how to explain the incident. 

Research presented at ECIS 2025 examined 7,941 U.S. data breach disclosures and found that organizations rarely rely on a single response strategy. The researchers identified 18 distinct combinations, including approaches such as compensation, apology, justification, excuses, and presenting the organization as a victim of the attack. 

These choices shape how the organization explains responsibility and responds to those affected. 

For CISOs, however, the factual foundation needs to come first. The organization may want to reassure customers or explain the actions already taken, but the message should remain within the boundaries of what the investigation can support. 

Conclusion: Communicate With the Incident as It Develops

Cyber crisis communication takes place while the facts are still developing.

Security teams may still be investigating while executives, employees, customers, partners, and regulators already need information. The organization therefore needs a communication process that can evolve with the incident.

That means keeping messages aligned with the current evidence, adapting information to the needs of different audiences, and considering how disclosure could affect the operational response.

This is what separates crisis communication from post-incident trust repair. Post-incident communication addresses what happens after the immediate crisis. Crisis communication helps the organization navigate the period when the outcome is still uncertain.

A mature incident response plan should therefore define how communication works before the first urgent request for an answer arrives.

For Further Reading

This blog post is based on insights and analysis from:

  • Covarrubias, Jersain Zadamig Llamas. “Effective communication as a pillar of cybersecurity: Managing incidents and crises in the digital era.” Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response 15.2 (2025): 34-34.
    https://doi.org/10.54560/jracr.v15i2.564 
  • Jechle, Deinera, Sebastian Schuetz, and Heiko Gewald. “Decoding Data Breach Response Strategies: Insights from Situational Crisis Communication Theory using Topic Modeling.” ECIS. 2025. 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393568155_Decoding_Data_Breach_Response_Strategies_Insights_from_Situational_Crisis_Communication_Theory_using_Topic_Modelling 

  • Jong, Wouter, Kelly Mikelatou, and Marcel Vielvoije. “When Crisis Communication Meets Forensics: Managing Narratives in Ransomware, Third-Party, and Nation-State Attacks.” Computers & Security (2026): 105082. 

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2026.105082 

The Board Is Asking Cybersecurity Questions. But Can It Judge the Answers?

The Board Has the Answers. Does It Understand Them?

A board can review every cybersecurity report, ask every recommended question, approve more investment, and still fail to govern cyber risk properly.

Cybersecurity has quietly changed the job description of the board, not because directors are expected to understand malware, analyse attack techniques, or debate the merits of competing security technologies, but because cyber incidents increasingly determine whether an organisation can continue operating, comply with regulatory obligations, preserve stakeholder trust, and execute its strategy. 

The discussion has therefore moved from technology to governance. This raises an uncomfortable question that many boards still need to answer: what does real accountability for cybersecurity look like?

For years, the answer seemed simple. Cybersecurity became a regular board topic, the CISO gave quarterly updates, dashboards became more detailed, and directors approved more spending or asked for independent reviews. From the outside, this looked like strong governance.

Recent academic research suggests that the reality is more complicated.

When Oversight Becomes Theatre 

A Full Agenda Is Not Proof of Governance 

One of the most important findings from recent research is not simply that boards struggle with cybersecurity. It is that many directors believe they are providing effective oversight, while cybersecurity specialists looking at the same process disagree.

The researchers interviewed directors, cybersecurity executives, and senior consultants, while also reviewing 1,000 firms from the Russell 3000. Only 14.7% reported having at least one director with cybersecurity or closely related expertise. More than half of the non-expert directors interviewed believed that specific cybersecurity expertise was not necessary for effective oversight, while none of the expert directors agreed.

The difference was not about effort. Non-expert directors attended meetings, reviewed reports, completed training, and asked questions just as expert directors did. The problem was that these activities could still remain symbolic if directors did not have enough knowledge to understand which information was truly reassuring and which information should change the board’s view of risk.

Governance is not measured by how many meetings are held or how many reports are reviewed. It is measured by whether directors can challenge assumptions, influence important decisions, and recognise when positive metrics hide serious weaknesses.

The researchers describe this as the difference between symbolic and substantive oversight. Symbolic oversight looks like governance. Substantive oversight improves the decisions that follow.

More Dashboards, Same Blind Spot 

Reports Still Need Context

The natural response to weak oversight is often to give directors more information: more dashboards, more indicators, more reports, and more external reviews.

But the problem is often not a lack of information. It is a lack of context, interpretation, and challenge.

A lower number of critical vulnerabilities may mean security has improved, but it may also mean the organisation changed how it measures them or reduced the scope of its scanning. High compliance scores may show that processes are being followed, but they may say very little about whether the organisation can continue operating during an attack. A positive assurance report may confirm that a review took place without showing whether it covered the systems, suppliers, and dependencies that matter most.

Without context, information can create confidence instead of understanding.

The information gap may also be larger than boards realise. In a supporting survey, CISOs estimated that the median share of peers who filtered reports to make themselves or their managers look better was 40%. The study does not prove that 40% of board reports are false, but it does show that experienced security leaders see selective reporting as a real governance risk.

A board without enough expertise may not notice when information has been softened, simplified, or framed to highlight progress. More importantly, it may not realise that there is anything to notice.

Monitoring Does Not Mean Governing 

Another study offers a useful way to think about this issue. Instead of treating oversight as a regular reporting task, the authors argue that boards should approach cybersecurity as an ongoing process of strategic sensemaking.

They describe three activities: scanning, interpretation, and action. These should continue before an incident, during an attack, and throughout recovery.

The board’s role is not to manage cybersecurity operations. It is to make sure the organisation keeps identifying important risks, understands what they mean for the business, and makes decisions that improve long-term resilience.

Accountability Starts Before the Incident

Governance failures often begin long before a cyber incident reaches the boardroom.

They begin when ownership of important risks is unclear, when business leaders assume cybersecurity belongs only to the security team, when supplier risk is reviewed separately from business continuity, or when management’s confidence is not supported by evidence the board can examine.

By the time an incident happens, many of the decisions that shape its impact have already been made. The organisation has already decided which systems are most important, which risks it will accept, which remediation deadlines can move, and which recovery capabilities deserve funding.

Strategic oversight therefore starts with clear ownership, clear decision rights, reliable evidence, and a direct link between cyber risk and business priorities.

The Questions Have Changed

For many years, boards asked whether the organisation had the right controls, whether regulatory duties had been met, or whether audits had found serious weaknesses. Those questions still matter, but they are no longer enough.

A stronger governance discussion asks whether the board understands which cyber risks could affect the organisation’s strategy, who owns those risks outside the security team, what evidence supports management’s confidence, and how directors would know if their current view of risk was no longer correct.

These questions are harder because they do not only ask for information. They ask for understanding.

Smart Directors Can Still Ask the Wrong Questions 

The study does not say that every board must appoint a former CISO. It does show that boards without real cybersecurity knowledge face a greater risk of confusing visible governance activity with effective oversight.

Directors with cybersecurity expertise are more likely to notice gaps, challenge assumptions, test reports, and separate technical detail from business impact. Their value is not mainly in explaining technology. It is in improving the board’s judgement.

One of the most important findings is that directors without cybersecurity expertise often do not realise that their oversight may lack depth. This creates a serious blind spot because boards cannot easily fix a weakness they do not recognise.

That does not mean one expert should carry the responsibility for the whole board. All directors still need to understand how cyber risk affects strategy, operations, finance, compliance, and trust. Expertise should improve the board’s work, not replace shared responsibility.

If Everyone Owns Cyber Risk, No One Does

Both studies point to the same basic issue: effective cybersecurity governance depends on visibility.

Directors need to know who owns important risks, how decisions are made, what evidence supports management’s confidence, which dependencies affect resilience, and how risk is changing across the organisation. Without that visibility, accountability is difficult to test or prove, even when everyone is acting in good faith.

Technology cannot create board accountability, but it can make accountability easier to see, challenge, and support with evidence.

This is where a governance platform can help. Its value is not in creating another separate dashboard, but in connecting risks, ownership, controls, evidence, compliance duties, and third-party relationships in one place.

Conclusion

The Board Will Be Judged by What It Can Prove 

Regulators, investors, customers, and executive teams increasingly expect boards to show not only that cybersecurity appears on the agenda, but that directors understand how cyber risk is governed, challenged, and connected to strategy.

That expectation cannot be met through reporting alone. It requires boards that are willing to question their own assumptions, organisations that can prove accountability instead of only describing it, and governance processes that turn cybersecurity from a technical issue into a business decision.

The boards that govern cyber risk well will not necessarily be those that receive the most information. They will be those that can challenge what they are told, recognise what is missing, and connect cyber risk to the decisions that shape the organisation’s future.

For Further Reading

This blog post is based on insights and analysis from:

  • Lowry, Michelle R., Anthony Vance, and Marshall D. Vance. “Inexpert supervision: Field evidence on boards’ oversight of cybersecurity.” Management Science 72.2 (2026): 783-804. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.0414